Archive for the ‘Institutions & Powers’ Category

One for the Handbook (literally, for once)

“One for the Handbook” refers to a new policy idea I have thought up, and so literally wish to enter into the (virtual) Political Handbook, rather than merely blog about.

My best blogs are reactive. In fact, my best ideas are reactive, even musically, I think. There’s something reactive about every creative human impulse — the best creativity needs to respond to something. Whether it’s my taking inspiration from popular songs such as “Sunshine, lollipops and rainbows”, “The way you look tonight” and “Bring me sunshine” (Fantasy on Sunshine, a sonata for solo violin, for any who happen to be interested in my music), or simply being inspired by a long walk or pleasant day in the traditional style, human creativity is rarely, if ever, without an impulse it reacts to. The same follows with policy. Government is the most reactive concept on earth — it exists purely in reaction to, and for the intention of correcting, social problems. (Whose problems, and who the solutions benefit are, of course, up for grabs.)

James Graham on Quaequam blog! has written, every once in a while, some very interesting articles on Intellectual Property and Copyright laws. I mean interesting, for once, in a most complimentary and not at all sarcastic or euphemism-laden way, as I like the thinking very much. It sparks off my own, very embryonic, thinking on the subject. This is why I’ve linked to the blog and not a particular article (the current article is dedicated to the subject, unless you’re reading this in a couple of days, when it could be off the front page), as this isn’t reacting against anything in particular, unlike most of my “response” articles to bloggers/columnists.

James’ analysis of existing copyright legislation is a devastating critique of the recording industry at the moment and, for the most part so far as I can see, correct. Copyright legislation at the moment exists mainly to the benefit of those who exploit musical talent rather than artists themselves.

I’m a little worried about coming across so Marxist, and indeed cannot explain why I feel such greater revulsion against the concept of “selling” intellectual labour than I do selling of labour in general. Now I come to think of it, though, it may be more about the concept of selling rights of property than rights of labour. I generally don’t have a problem with artists working for larger companies, with them making a rational decision to sell their labour for a fair price (note, a fair price, not any price). I guess it’s more the idea of companies obtaining a fundamental ownership of the value of the art itself, a sense of ownership of the actual artistic endeavour being transferred, that riles me. As an artist, I obviously have a clear prejudice here, and cannot say that it is logical that I should feel less bothered by, say, the selling of conventional property that one might have produced.

Except that in many cases, property one creates cannot be argued as decisively to be your original work as art can. After all, in typing for a company as a receptionist, though doubtlessly a skilled job, the words created are of little value to me and require little skill of artistic creativity, though very different skills are required. However, in typing this blog, assuming for the moment that I am a talented writer, I could be creating something of genuinely new and irreplaceable value, a work of unique art (yeah, right!)

My point is, of course, far from black and white, and is one which would invariably travel, if it were allowed, to the debate as to what constitutes art in the first place, and where creativity has been applied as opposed to simple activity. Yet I do believe that such a distinction exists. This will doubtlessly put me at odds at many who believe that the concept of creativity is an illusion, that it disguises truth, and that it interferes with rationality, etc., etc.. I can’t argue with that — it is too fundamental a disagreement. So I can merely use this as a starting point.

I do therefore believe that a case for intellectual ownership of a work one can produce easily without creativity is far more difficult to make than for one where creativity is required, and the outcome is unique. Defining this is the problem, and I would not for one moment assume that I am capable of defining where a work becomes a work of art and ceases to be a work of mundane application of uncreative, robotic skills. Clearly creativity and innovation are not enough, as they are also applied to many business decisions and strategies, the copyrighting of which would be patent nonsense. Clearly something of unique and irreplaceable value has to be produced, but here again we come up against a minefield of definition.

Even so, difficulties of definition aside, I do think there is a clear place for intellectual copyright, and moreover, a clear case for some form of limitation on the extent to which it can be “sold” and “purchased”. Moreover, simply because definition is difficult, does not mean that these rights are not needed. I think that on a fundamental level, it is obvious that they are: I think it is obviously false to state that “music should be free” as it is to state that “information should be free”. Neither are free. No “should” will change this, both have a cost at the original level of production.

There are, of course, models to get around this. Spotify is an example. Yet I doubt that such models are capable of covering all content; what is more, even if they could I am not sure whether I like the implications for artists if they are limited to one means of distributing their content, and the potential for abuse that could follow. The advantages of a level of copyright protection are that artists may have a certain amount of personal autonomy, answering to no-one, being truly self-employed.

But, as already stated, I am in clear agreement that the current set-up favours business over artist, and is not about protection of the individual. Such a claim would be laughable. So what can be done to reverse this? I have a couple of ideas:

a) Firstly, remove the inheritance principle. Though I might feel differently about this were I a parent, I hope I would hold to my principles: no potential child of mine should be able to benefit, once they are an adult, from my work as a musician and composer. They would hold no greater intellectual right than anyone else, even if they had immeasurable artistic ability of their own.

b) For obvious reasons, an copyright expiration upon death might not be the safest of policies. Nor from a perspective of equity does it seem reasonable — there are various arguments at play here, but in terms of a “leaving something for your children if you die suddenly” question, the most equitable arrangement that I can think of off-hand would be around 20 years, a generation.

c) Things are complicated, however, by the factor of deferred success. It is possible that I may write something that, having left the undiscerning public cold for 20 years, suddenly becomes very popular. In which case, I am shafted if the limit is inflexible. I therefore suggest that the initial limit be a simple one on what your work can earn to an unlimited extent, but an additional time limit exists as to what your work can earn in total.

This could work two ways: it could be “on top” of whatever your work earns in the first 20 years, or it could be including the first 20 years of earnings. The latter concept would be more socialist in concept, setting a more “absolute” price on what a work of art should earn, for this reason, I am tempted to disown it, though the former concept also does this to an extent. Either way, it could serve a severe limitation upon the ability of artists or companies to exploit a popular work to reap huge rewards through limiting distribution. There would have to be an absolute limit, perhaps something like 75 years, upon which any work is guaranteed to enter public domain.

d) I must confess to be unaware of the law surrounding the extent to which the copyright of a work can be “sold on”, so here I enter the area of speculation. I believe fundamentally that the extent one can sell or purchase copyright should be limited to so protect the original producer, or that the limit of 20 years should be binding upon anyone who is benefiting from “purchased” copyright, and either revert back to the producer afterward, or, if they are dead, become public domain.

This is all very initial. I am unaware of many very important facts to this debate, and this serves just as much as an attempt to define some of my thinking as it does any detailed policy argument from me. However, I hope it proves to be a constructive addition to the debate.

My questions to and answers from Vernon Bogdanor on Primaries:

About a week ago, I participated in a “question and answer” submission set up by “Open Up”, to professor Vernon Bogdanor (professor of government at Oxford University, and one-time Tutor to David Cameron). Having been impressed by Bogdanor’s argument before, I was intrigued to see him as a strong supporter of Open Primaries, particularly given his support for introducing Single Transferable Vote, and believe that Primaries would be a step in this direction (rather than away, which is my view, as I have blogged about on here before).

I put three questions to him, and wasn’t disappointed to see that he only answered two (after all, there were quite a few contributions, and I was, thinking over it, quite lucky to get more than one answered). Here are the questions, with his answers:

Question: Won’t open primaries vastly lengthen and increase the expense of the electoral process, and make life more difficult for minority parties, independents and candidates from disadvantaged circumstances? Won’t they increase the problems surrounding campaign funding, many of which are evident from the US system?

Professor Bogdanor: To avoid this outcome, I think there should be a spending cap administered by the Electoral Commission.

Question: Could open primaries lead to a further entrenched two-party system, where the largest parties become the easiest option for those seeking to enter politics, to the detriment of pluralism and diversity; and the smaller parties find it impossible to compete, having insufficient candidates to make primaries feasible?

Professor Bogdanor: The truth is that nobody knows. The most likely outcome is that it will increase enthusiasm for democracy and so help all parties.

To be fair, I believe his response to the first question is quite reasonable. Though, as I blogged on The Daily Soapbox, a spending cap could well be utterly insufficient in terms of helping disadvantaged candidates and preventing primaries from shifting the burden further against them; it has to be recognised that this is to a large degree speculation (particularly as I am not aware of many comparisons other than the United States, which has lax campaign funding laws). A spending cap could certainly help avoid some of the more serious problems of campaign funding in Primaries, although in my personal opinion it would not go nearly further enough, and does not address the problem that those already at a disadvantage in the electoral system will be disproportionately effected by the simple cost of running a primary campaign, cap or no cap.

I regard the second answer as a dodge, unfortunately — it is possible that I worded the question badly (I am notoriously bad at concise summations, which explains the general length of my articles on here, facebook and The Daily Soapbox). Of course, the fact that no-one knows is an obvious truth (one could call it a ‘truism’), but the fact is that an increase in enthusiasm for parties obviously does not equate to something which “helps all parties” — indeed, a look at the US shows that in many ways, they are more interested in participation and democracy than we are, but despite this have a far more entrenched two-party system. Parties are things which arise out of democracy, but are entirely pragmatic arrangements, and beyond the existence of an opposition, bear little relation to the level of democracy.

The simple fact is that it is obvious that small parties would struggle to compete, because they face a choice of either holding primaries — and thus playing a larger role in the local democratic process — or fielding as many candidates as possible on the national level. This would effectively put them between a rock and a hard place, particularly if they were in the position of emerging between minority status, and mainstream status. It is easy to see how primaries could entrench the two-party system, therefore — at least under a single-member system.

The other point about Primaries making the two main parties the easiest route into politics is also unchallenged by Professor Bogdanor’s reply, and would go some way to explaining why in the US, despite the greater prevalence of democracy (which may or may not be a good thing), the two party system is more entrenched. When discussing third parties in American politics with my excellent A level teacher, one of his points concerning their lack of success was “what’s the point, when the two parties are broadchurch, and can just as easily accommodate people’s views?” Ultimately, it is this which exposes the false equation the Professor makes between pluralism and democracy; democracy is ultimately about participation, and if it is easier to participate in mainstream parties then the mainstream parties will disproportionally benefit.

So overall, fair first question response (though for obvious reasons, I disagree that it would be sufficient), slightly disappointed by the second response, which I feel would probably be ripped apart in a Oxford politics class, given that we were trained to deconstruct that in A level politics. But fair play to the Professor for taking the time to engage in the first place; he must have had a lot of questions to respond to!

EDIT: I have just noticed this question, later down on the page:

Question: What about smaller parties? Should they have open primaries too? Won’t their comparative lack of funding put them at a disadvantage?

Professor Bogdanor: Yes, smaller parties should have open primaries too. The question of whether they will be at a disadvantage raises the whole issue of whether there should be state funding of political parties, on which views legitimately differ.

(Not asked by myself)

I don’t wish to tackle his views on state funding of political parties here (or what I assume to be his views, because as he indicates, it would be the most obvious way of correcting this problem), merely the assumption that this is the only disadvantage to smaller parties. It patently is not — funding is certainly one problem, but simply numbers is another — a small party, however well funded, is still small, it still has to face a shortage of candidates, and putting itself at a disadvantage if it is to grant electors a choice of more than one candidate in a primary.

I’m also going to be slightly pedantic, and also address the final question and answer:

Question: Is there any evidence that open primaries will lead to better government?

Professor Bogdanor: “Better government” is in part a subjective matter. Open primaries will lead to more participation and therefore better democracy.

…pedantic, because I wish to question the equation of greater participation and better democracy, and undermine a previous argument I made slightly. Though democracy, as I said earlier, is ultimately about participation, it is also very much affected by the level of pluralism, and it does not follow that increased participation will necessarily strengthen democracy. I would like to reference the State of California (and the state of California) as an example here, where referendums and initiatives are relatively easy, and there have been widespread accusations of interest groups sabotaging the democratic wishes of communities at large. Also, unhelpful laws have been introduced which hinder representative democracy, namely a requirement for a 2/3 supermajority in order to ratify the State budget, which recently nearly made California the first State in US history to go bankrupt.

House of Lords Reform ~~ An Update

In reading about the House of Lords in a 1990s book “Does Parliament Work?” — in an effort to improve my knowledge about the Lords and Parliament in general — and reading with interest the part about the house’s greater informality than the House of Commons, a thought struck me.

One of the things most agreed by consensus in favour of the House of Lords is its ability to include expertise and specialism when debating legislation. I have often argued in the past for the crossbenchers, among whom are experts appointed by the House of Lords Appointments Commission, to stay holding the balance of power within the House of Lords, whatever other reforms are made to its composition, to secure as best possible the retention of this expertise, complementary to the other purposes reforms may serve. But it struck me that there exists an even better way of ensuring the expertise, as well as the continued informality of process. And, as my friend Ewan Short would like, a check upon the potential for democratically elected peers to get ideas above their station in the event of democratic reform.

I think that the House committees should have the ability to, if sufficiently inspired, offer temporary rights to people outside the House of Lords to take part in debates and have limited voting rights. This would open up the House to popular participation in a more informal, caucus-style way than pure democracy would, which would reward popular participation and, more importantly, dedication in areas of public interest.

It would also prove a check against democratically elected peers getting the idea that they were the most “important” part of the house in a part-democratic House of Lords. It would (if used properly) strengthen the houses’ claim to diversity, speciality and expertise, and make it a better understood and respected national institution. It would also promote it as an alternative means of representation to the House of Commons.

It strikes me that if we go down this route, it will also take fire out of the hands of “all-or-nothing” democracy campaigners for the House of Lords, which would be No Bad Thing. All in all, I think this could be not only quite a nice idea for the future of the House of Lords, but potentially quite an important one as well.

As usual, please notify me if I have completely missed obvious or important things by adding your comments underneath.


Parliamentary Soveriengty and the modern dominance of the Executive

Timothy Garton Ash, writing in the Guardian, quotes Labour MP Tony Wright as saying “the main objective of members of the legislature is to join the executive”, and also as apparently making the point subsequently that the main objective of our electoral system is now to choose a government, not representatives of the people (thus highlighting one of the severe problems with Parliamentary systems when it comes to selecting the best voting system; that constant tension between choosing local representatives and holding a government to account. This is at least partly the reason why the USA suffers less from the debate regarding Electoral Reform and the deficiencies of First Past the Post, because it has a separated government and legislature).

Contrary to what you’re possibly expecting, this is not wholly a note on Electoral Reform. It’s actually a few broader observances I have to make re: the “Electoral Dictatorship” debate.

Firstly, I am unsure how much the complaint that Parliament has become neutered in particular over the last ten years is accurate. It is entirely possible that it is due to the effect of the sudden transition from a small majority House (John Major’s steadily eroded majority of 21 from 1992-1997) to three real majority terms, two of them landslide majorities. Certainly, in terms of raw statistics, parliamentary rebellions are more common now than they were under Thatcher in the 1980s, something you rarely see reported in the Press.

In terms of changes to Parliament, there might be something in the complaint – it is certainly true that the government attempted to pass a bill which would have given it incredible scope for secondary legislation (legislation delegated from Parliament to other authorities such as the Executive), and nearly got away with it – the legislation in the end was watered down significantly, though still a worrying development. For more information, google “Death of Parliament Bill”.

The Tories have also made complaints regarding the timetabling of Parliament, which they argue has neutered its debating ability. There may be something to this, too – I am not too sure, as I do not know enough about the subject – but it is certainly untrue to posit that until recently the government had no way of frustrating debate in the Commons. It has had the power to “guillotine” bills for a long time prior to 1997, and went from using this power in exceptional cases to using it with regularity a long time ago.

But the original complaint, that of Parliamentary subordination, is already watered down by the behaviour of MPs, who we have already seen have, if anything, been more rebellious in general towards the Executive. Certainly, if Parliament is now more controlled by the Executive, it is through other ways than whipping. The whips in general are no more powerful now than they have been for a considerable time.

One thing is becoming clear, however, it is that the House of Commons is never going to regain practical “sovereignty” over the government in an age where people are quick to expect government action on their everyday problems, and where the media continually breeds the impression that a government must be seen to do something. In a fused Legislature and Executive, it is not in the interests of MPs to go against this attitude towards government. Parliamentary scrutiny procedure can be slow and talky, which some people can find frustrating and the media may find to be less eye-catching than government or opposition press releases.

And coupled with the trend towards people voting more directly to influence the Executive than to elect a good local representative, it becomes clear that a simple switch to PR will not help Parliament regain practical sovereignty one jot, whatever other benefits it may bring. List systems could have the effect of making MPs more obedient to the will of their parties, because the local connection will be diluted and parties will have to vote even more as blocks on the floor of the house. In essence, introducing list PR could make the Executive more practically superior, not less. Countries such as Sweden have not experienced more independence among their MPs, even with a somewhat open form of List PR.

We are also seeing more use, not less, of MPs as “local advocates”. It would be worryingly dismissive to see electoral reform as the panacea all sovereignty ills without considering what advantages the current system has, and how to build upon them.

If Parliament wishes to regain practical sovereignty, therefore, the reforms need to be on a far more practical level, and a way fundamental to parliament’s working, than merely changing the way MPs are elected. Given that people find talking-heavy responses to immediate concerns frustrating, the Commons needs to find more quick and punchy ways of allowing MPs to highlight the concerns of their constituents. Better time granted to Private Members Bills and more weighty powers for committees to require responses from government departments may be a start to this, though I remain a novice when it comes to understanding of Parliamentary procedure. But a more fundamental reform may be simpler than people think.

The House of Lords has acquired for itself the reputation of a good “Revising chamber”, where bad quality legislation is amended so to make it far more effective and put to better use. Granting people local representatives in the House of Lords would be an excellent “safety-check” on the centralised and executive-dominated representatives in the House of Commons, and might even allow for quicker response to constituents’ concerns. It is bitterly ironic that the more effective chamber for holding the government to account legislatively is the one which currently has no ties to local constituencies.

If representatives for constituencies are elected to the House of Lords, then the current strengths must be retained. Peers should still have the independence and expertise the House is famous for at the moment. This requires two things: firstly, that crossbenchers continue to be appointed by the House of Lords Appointments Commission (contrary to popular belief, this is not a process controlled by the government), and secondly, that Peers are elected through a different process to the House of Commons, to different ends.

This latter point can be achieved through two ways: firstly, that Peers are not elected by the same form of election as the House of Commons. This would be a redundancy, as it has already been seen that the single-member system leads to large numbers of constituents’ votes being unrepresented. A secondary system of election should correct this, not add to it. The only criteria for such a system should be local representation, not necessarily single-member representation. A sensible suggestion would seem to be the Single Transferable Vote, although other locally favourable and broadly representative systems exist.

Secondly, that Peers be elected for single-terms only. These terms should probably be longer, in the region of 8-12 years, and this would preserve the independence and ability to apply expertise that Peers currently enjoy. It would merely speed up the process of the Lords, ensuring that constituents are granted continuous democratic influence on a more effective locally representatives House of Lords, whilst ensuring that the Upper chamber is not susceptible to the same form of electoral bribery that the Lower chamber is.

An upper chamber of a bicameral legislature needs to complement the lower chamber, not replicate its flaws, and not go into gridlock with it. The current arrangement does this very well, but it can still be improved. It requires tweaking, not rebuilding. And if any legislative reform is to be attempted to make Parliament practically sovereign once more, a more representative and high profile second chamber is the best place to start.

Mr. Speaker

Recently, a friend of mine highlighted an issue to me that was so obvious that I was surprised I hadn’t recognised it. It concerns the Speaker, a vague House of Commons convention, and the idea of single-member democratic representation.

There is, my friend argued, a convention that sitting Speakers should not be challenged in a general election. Therefore this leaves their constituents with a huge headache; not only do they have the problem of a non-partisan representative (and one who cannot be relied upon to put constituency concerns before the house), but if their non-partisan representative is unchallenged, they are effectively disenfranchised.

There is a lot of merit in this argument, too much to simply dismiss it. It does arguably need a little qualification. If this is a convention, it is a decidedly lop-sided one; the Conservatives have not stood against Speakers seeking re-election, regardless of their previous political affiliation. But Labour and the Liberal Democrats have stood against ex-Conservative Speakers. (

Moreover, the merits of the speaker being unchallenged in a general election are too great to simply dismiss out of hand, either, further complicating the matter. Forcing a speaker to fight a close constituency contest would inevitably force him or her into greater political controversy, compromising their position of neutrality within the House itself. Moreover, it could have the novel result in resulting in more unexpected problems for other constituencies; if the sitting speaker is defeated, and a member from another constituency elected to the speakership without the prior understanding of their constituents, how can this be any more democratic than the current arrangements?

However, one thing is clear: in a single-member system, a speaker cannot be a constituency representative in the same way as other members of the House, because of the reasons outlined above. Therefore there is a clear, if not large-scale, need of reform in some way or another. Personally, I am inclined towards the idea of a Speaker, once elected by the House to that position, not requiring re-election from a constituency, and having the option to retire his seat whilst remaining Speaker. This would allow for the political neutrality, whilst retaining democratic accountability (through the House of Commons election of the Speaker) and re-enfranchising the constituents of the Speaker’s old seat. But there are doubtless many other suggestions.

David Starkey and Constitutional Reform

[This is an archive of an note written about Question Time on Thursday, 23rd April 2009]

I gained much entertainment from watching David Starkey on Question Time. I had heard that he was quite barking, but I hadn’t quite realised the extent previously. Fabulous powers of speech.

However, I wasn’t as impressed by his analysis of the US system. From a historical perspective, of course, he was unsurprisingly right. The US system was modelled on the structure of the British system of the time.

However, his argument that the US system means that the US legislature operates far more respectfully than Britain’s due to its rather over-zealous separation of powers (sorry, prejudices getting ahead of me there) rather baffles me, because it’s demonstrably not true. Rather amusingly, he sums up his tirade with a cherry on the cake: “constitutional reform. In one word: constitutional reform”.

American legislators are always being derided for “pork-barrel politics”, in the House in particular. In the Senate, the power of the filibuster is most renouned for being used as an obstruction to some of the most essential of reforms in history.

Neither does Starkey’s argument that the US Congress “actually hold[s] the government to account” hold much water after the rather catastrophic failure of it to hold George W. Bush properly to account over the last 8 years. But what is particularly baffling is why he thinks the reason that the British parliament’s ineffectiveness is due to the lack of such a structural sepration of powers.

It really has nothing to do with it. In theory, the British system could potentially be a lot better than the US one in holding the government to account, and certainly more flexible. Structurally, Parliament is sovereign, with the Executive subordinate, which means that in the case of fundamental disagreement between the two, such as the voting down of a budget, the sensible thing happens which is that the matter is put to the people, rather than what happened in the USA in 1995, where the federal government just shut down.

Essentially, structurally, the Parliamentary system has the clear advantage, as a Parliament can dismiss an Executive if it deems it unfit for service. Of course, this doesn’t happen, and the reasons are a number of things, mainly separating into two categories, the first being an accumulation of informal powers of influence over the House of Commons (and Lords, for that matter) that the government has generally up its sleeve to retain control, the second arguably being the voting system, which gives it a more fundamental on-going domination.

But really, this has nothing to do with the structural division of powers. Seperation of Powers in the USA results in neither branch being held to account, as much as it results in responsible accountability. It’s a system which divides accountability as much as it strengthens it. It’s a rigid, inflexible system that is also more difficult to reform fluidly over time. All this Starkey passes over for a piece of cheap rhetoric.

But his rhetoric is good, I’ll give it that. And very entertaining.

A letter on Constitutional Reform

When I was at my most radical, I wrote this letter on Constitutional Reform. I now look back on it with little bit of mingled embarrassment and amusement, and also with the critical enjoyment that comes with re-reading, and correcting, one’s earlier arguments.

(IE: I do not still agree with much of this, but still find much of it interests me. Hopefully, not just me!)

[Preamble: when I call this a letter, I actually mean it was a letter (:-o), to a friend of mine. For this reason, a very few things have been edited. I have also made a few edits designed to provide clarity of what I meant, as I wrote this fairly late into the night.]

Constitutional… REFORM

1. Assemblies, Parliaments and devolved powers

As you may have noticed, democracy in this country is in a bit of a mess. Currently less than 60% of people turn out to vote, and roughly 37% of those hold almost all the cards in a small minority of regions countrywide. The net effect of this at present is that the weight of elections swings almost always on the not inconsiderable girth of what is known, somewhat derogatorily, as “Middle England”.

I say “almost all the cards” because other than of course the occasional off-chance that a government might lose a constituency with a 13,700 majority – almost a rotten borough in democratic standards – we have a second chamber, and one which has exercised considerably more power of late than it has throughout much of its history, due to a not ineffective programme of reform put through by the Labour government. It can even be argued to be more representative despite being unelected, as no party holds a majority – like the popular vote – and there exist such things as cross-benchers and independents – like individual voters nationwide. So it is clear that, ridiculously, despite being unelected, the House of Lords complements the Commons when it comes to democracy rather than limiting what already limited democracy there is; notwithstanding doing stupid things like wasting Parliamentary time by forcing the Commons to vote on a completely neutered fox-hunting ban on three separate occasions.

Thus the first principle of reform is that bicameralism can, and does, enhance democracy by offering what aspects are inevitably lacking in one specific form. With greater bicameralism, we could see from the Lords an effect similar to that of devolution, with the most stupid excesses of one governing body being checked by a smaller body, inferior in powers but superior in powers of scrutiny. Which leads me on to…

Having seen the effectiveness of the devolution experiments almost in every way and on every level, there is clearly one deficit remaining to address: England. The lack of devolved democracy to England has served to further strain the Union‘s support within England and, indirectly, Scotland. It is clear, therefore, that an English parliament is needed, what is also clear, however, is that a) as the devolution experiment in the Greater London Assembly has indisputably succeeded, further devolution to the remaining regional assemblies is desirable, and this ties in with b) England is a far larger and culturally varied constituent country than either Scotland or Wales, and that the North of the country can, clumsily, be argued to be as different to the South of the country as many parts of Wales are. Thus it would be an idea to have the English parliament comprised of the individual members of the 9 assemblies (all democratically reformed), and operate on the basis that to pass a motion, a majority of both members and Assemblies must be required.

It is also fair to suggest that Wales and Northern Ireland should have the same devolved powers as Scotland.

The second principle is thus that devolution works, and should be more equal.

To get back to bicameralism and Parliamentary reform, as I hadn’t reached my conclusions; and to get away from federalism (as devolution will probably ultimately become known as, if irrational fear of the term is not too great) as it has a reputation of boring nearly everyone; it is clear that a second chamber can be used to democratically complement (note: not “check” or “react against” or anything else so American) a first. And it is clear that the Lords needs to be reformed to do so far more effectively than it does so now; but to maximise on the type of work it does now, not to react against it. (For all the talk of “Tony’s cronies” the House of Lords has probably operated since Blair’s reforms better and more independently than in any other period of its history.) Before I can expand on this, however, I would like to look at the strengths of the House of Commons, after slandering it so much in the beginning paragraphs.

The strengths, having been gone into by countless others can, in my so humble estimation, be summarised as:

· A tendency to produce strong governments

· Having flexible powers of holding the executive to account, such as being capable of forcing elections, despite the dominance of the executive that stems from the merging of the two powers

· An encouragement, on paper, of local, delegate-type, democracy, which would in theory add an individualist touch to our democracy (though it patently doesn’t in practice).

It is worth, of course, noting the fact that two of those are certainly true on paper, but almost certainly not the case in practice – well, the second true in times of incomplete political change, but the third almost never. It is for this reason that I do not support proposals to introduce closed or open list Proportional Representation to the House of Lords. As the Commons does not encourage individualism in politics even with a system that centres around individual constituencies, how much less so would a House of Lords controlled by parties who decide who goes on the list? This does bring me to a third principle of reform, after the democratic strengths of greater bicameralism and more equal devolution: there needs to be greater individualism in politics: IE individual representation and contribution.

To address the practical problems with the democracy of the Commons, one must look towards the prime villain, the way constituencies elect their MPs, in other words: First Past the Post.

People often make the mistake of assuming First Past the Post as the most obvious individual constituency system: it is not. The most obvious one is one which recognises the existence of the principle of anyone being able to stand for election; First Past the Post does not. It assumes that only two will stand – an absurd assumption.

First Past the Post does not require that a majority of the constituency supports the winner, another absurdity, allowing candidates to represent an entire set of people with only the backing of a minority – the more candidates standing the smaller the minority likely to be.

The most obvious system is actually one which gives people the power to truly choose between the candidates and ensures that the winning candidate captures majority support of the candidate. The way many parties achieve this is by knock-out elections, taking ballot after ballot with the person with the lowest support being eliminated, until a person gains a majority of the vote. This, however, is lengthy and expensive, but can be replicated simply by having people vote in order of preference, and having their choices redistributed as each losing candidate is “knocked out”. Of course, this would massively increase the workload of those counting the ballots, but let’s face it: determining the will of the people should not be an easy job.

This would, therefore, give minority candidates at least a positive “voice” in elections even if their chances of gaining actual representative status remain slim. “Big” candidates, IE major party ones would logically be far more receptive of what minority candidates stand for, as they would usually (except for the case of “rotten boroughs” like Bill Wiggin’s constituency) be relying in preference votes. It would certainly remove the negative influence of minority candidates on elections: IE the hated phenomenon of vote-splitting.

This system is actually called single transferable vote as well as preferential vote and numerous other names, but it often gets confused with STV multi-member – which is far more complicated.

STV multi-member has the advantage, however, of ensuring roughly proportional results and favouring independents far more than any single-member system tends to, roughly the strengths of the makeup of the House of Lords at present. Thus I propose reforming the voting system to have the commons elected by STV-single member, and that the first stage of reform of the House of Lords is to introduce elections in the form of STV-multi-member.

Another of the House of Lords’ strengths has often been argued, sometimes by myself, often by others, to be its immunity to the problem of populism, in the fact that Peers are appointed for life. For a long while I struggled with this, and until recently favoured Peers being elected for Life (before that, in fact, I favoured an entirely appointed chamber, though I have always remained firm on the subject of hereditaries); until upon realising the indisputable advantages of greater bicameralism to democracy, I realised that such a state of affairs would do little to help voting apathy and popular involvement in politics, effectively limiting the democracy of the Lords to bi-elections in the event of death (even in STV-multi-member, though that would have the amusing effect of forcing by-elections for other regional MPs in the event of a death, thus making their lives more endangered by the desire to remove a whole section at once). My attention then turned to term-limits. Now it would be unfair not to mention the problems that term limits have often created (particularly as I used to rail against them with regard to American politics, and indeed did so in A level exams), not least the removal of accountability they often result in. But it is a limited problem in a second chamber with inferior powers, in any case (I would not support equal powers for both chambers, having the Commons dominant removes the risk of excessive gridlock), and particularly one intended to address the deficits of the Commons’ democracy, one of which is excessive “populism” or “re-electioneering” at the expense of both efficient government and of true representation of the people’s interests. Until recently I favoured some kind of clumsy “contract” for Peers’ manifestos, where Peers could be taken to court of they truly did violate specific pledges (a negative system, where they could only be legally challenged on the basis of violating pledges rather than simply not pursuing them). But what struck me as far more interesting and far less clumsy – particularly if the Lords’ is to be the “more representative chamber” – was a “description” (I use the word generously; it was more of a loving tribute) of Swiss democracy that I read:

“Citizens have the right to demand that any Parliamentary measure be put to popular vote. For a vote to be triggered, 50,000 signatures are needed … while all constitutional amendments proposed by Parliament must be put to a popular vote.”

Replicating this for our country would be clumsy and liable to abuse: turnout for referenda would be likely to be low with many unaffected or uninterested – or merely not having the time for each of the many referenda that would be called with such a system simply not bothering to turn out, thus the point of such referenda would be nullified, as they could not be said to be truly representative.

Why not, however, have regional mechanisms for such a thing as a check against Peers’ abuse of their lack of re-election accountability? It would fit a system of STV-multi-member far better than a single-member system: the number of signatures needed to trigger a vote need only be the droop quota for the most recent election: the proportion of votes of the people for/against the proposition are then rounded up to the nearest proportion of the seats that region elects: (say, in a 6-seat constituency, 5-1, 4-2, 3-3, etc., etc..); if more than the droop quota out of eligible voters fail to turn out, these “seat-votes” are treated in addition to those of the members for that region, if it is over this turnout quota, then they replace the parliamentary votes of the members of that region.

This gives the people a way of holding their Peers to account, hopefully protected enough to prevent a single faction of a region from dominating and nullifying the votes of their Peer representatives. It is fairly complex, to say the least, but it hopefully has the potential of working in some way similar to the intention.

Thus, after all this, I would say the fourth principle of reform is both of greater involvement with politics and also in breaking down the boundaries between indirect and direct democracy.

The last point concerning the strengthening of democracy by greater bicameralism is regarding legislative abilities – and ties in, incidentally, with both greater direct democratic involvement and greater individualism in politics. The Lords are clearly even now in a position to offer just as “valuable” legislative contributions as the Commons – and hopefully, in a reformed Parliament, such contributions would be far more valuable to the nation than they are at present. Though I support the Commons being the superior chamber in powers, I also support greater independence of the Lords from the commons, and whilst I’m perfectly happy with the Parliament act as it stands, I would suggest one final addition:

If the Lords introduce and pass a bill, and the Commons block it, give the Lords the right to vote whether or not to hold a referendum, which would have the power to override the Commons. This referendum, however, would require 50% of the electorate to be in support, thus in practice requiring a greater majority the fewer turn out, and have no chance of success if the turnout was below 50%, even in the event of a unanimous vote in support of the Lords – this would prevent the Lords from voting for referenda on uninteresting things such as the fox-hunting ban.

Therefore, to summarise (phew), we have:

The four principles of reform:

Greater bicameralism can strengthen and add to democracy, with each chamber making up for the democratic deficits in the other.

Devolution can and has been shown to work, and should be equal to be truly democratic and in the interests of each constituent nation in the Union.

Greater individualism within politics is needed, to weaken the death-grip on power of political parties, both to grant greater power to the people to elect independent delegates, and to grant greater contribution to elected individuals on the legislative agenda.

Greater involvement in politics is needed, not just in elections but in holding their representatives to account for individual pieces of legislation and thus breaking down the barriers that exist between our indirect democracy and direct democracy.

The House of Commons would be reformed thus:

  1. Elected by preferential vote (IE STV-single member).
  2. Greater (IE at least doubled) resources for individual legislation (IE Private Members’ Bills)

The House of Lords would be reformed thus:

  1. Made elected by Single Transferable Vote for multi-member constituencies using the Droop quota.
  2. Members elected for Single Terms.
  3. Voters for each region given the power to trigger a popular regional vote: the number of signatures required being the droop quota for the most recent election. The vote is rounded proportionally onto the number of seats: if the turnout deficit is higher than the droop quota, these “seat-votes” are treated in addition to the vote of the peers representing the region, if the turnout deficit is lower than this, they replace the votes of the peers for the region.
  4. The House of Lords has the right to override the House of Commons via popular vote, but the number supporting the Lords must be over 50% of the electorate.

Devolution would be completed thus:

  1. An English Parliament would be created, comprised of each of the regional assemblies: each themselves reformed to be democratic in the same way as the devolution to London. The English Parliament would require a majority of both members and constituencies to pass a motion.
  2. Wales, Northern Ireland and England would have equal devolved powers, though how such powers would be distributed among the regional and English Parliament level in England would be up for discussion.

I hope this begins to satisfy the demands of interest. : – )